Salama Fikira

Contents

Preamble

Salama Fikira have been requested to provide a security assessment of the Sheraton Kampala and its environs, to include a threat assessment and a site security assessment. The assessment will aim to provide a succinct report documenting the risks presented to the client. The below report will focus initially on a threat assessment followed by a discussion of site security and will conclude with summarising remarks and a risk matrix.

Executive Summary

a. Threat Assessment

- The main threats facing the site stem from opportunistic crime involving staff members and incidents of civil unrest in the vicinity of the site.

- As guests at the Sheraton Kampala and participants of the planned conference are likely to be perceived as affluent, criminal elements may have a heightened intent to conduct opportunistic criminal acts, in particular petty theft.

- The underlying threat from terrorism in Kampala cannot be dismissed, but is currently assessed to be low.

- The surrounding threat environment is characterised by a low-to-moderate frequency of low-intensity incidents due to a high density of security forces guarding government installations in the area.

b. Site Security Assessment

- Overall security measures are the Sheraton Kampala are assessed to be comprehensive and able to mitigate most likely threats encountered at the site.

- Access control and technological security measures are combined to provide a comparably high degree of control over individuals despite the public nature of the property.

- Extensive operational links to nearby security forces and a notable presence of armed government security forces at the site were observed.

- Minor sources of concern were identified in the outer perimeter defences of the compound, which are somewhat mitigated by robust building security measures.

Security Threat Assessment

The below section will consider threats specific to the Sheraton Kampala. However, whilst the document seeks to remain succint, at times it is deemed neccesary to consider the wider threats to both Nairobi and Kenya to give an understanding of the potential implications for the site.

Heatmap of incidents recorded in Kampala over the past 12 months

a. Crime

As in many capital cities, petty and opportunistic crime is a concern in Kampala. The most frequently observed forms of opportunistic criminal activity are bag snatching, pick-pocketing and theft from vehicles, though these incidents are somewhat less common in comparison to other East African cities, most notably Nairobi. More organised forms of criminal activity occasionally recorded include home-invasions and armed robberies, although the use of firearms is relatively uncommon. As with most areas, the threat of being targeted by criminal elements is generally higher during hours of darkness, however, vigilance is also advised during daylight hours. Slums in Kampala and the areas of Kawaala, Nansana, Lungujja Nateete, Ndejje, Gangu-Busabala, Nyanama, Busega, Bunamwaya and Najjanankumbi are the most insecure areas of Kampala with the highest crime rates. Motorists affected by frequent increased traffic congestion are also sometimes targeted by opportunistic criminals, with mobile phones and other small, easily transported items being taken by assailants on foot or on a motorbike by reaching through a lowered window. Thus, it is advised that vehicle windows remain closed at all times.

Foreign nationals may be specifically targeted for their perceived wealth. Guests of the prominent Sheraton Kampala in particular are likely to be perceived as high-value targets for criminal elements. Theft by hotel staff is conceivable, but somewhat mitigated by security measures (key control, CCTV coverage, vetting procedures) that have been put in place. Nonetheless, it is advised that hotel guests store their cash and valuables securely, as rooms are

equipped with relatively large safes. The threat from organised criminal groups directly targeting the hotel is assessed to be low.

b. Kidnapping

The threat of kidnappings targeting foreign nationals remains conceivable, although such incidents are recorded with a low frequency in Kampala, with 15 such incidents recorded over the past 12 months. However, it is reminded that the nature of kidnappings – with ransom demands unlikely to be publicised by affected individuals – also increases the likelihood of incidents going unreported. In the most recent incident, a child was kidnapped and murdered in Kireka Bbira, Kampala, on 02nd January 2019. Police arrested the abductor after tracing the calls he had made to demand for ransom. It is noted that a substantial number of reported abductions are carried out by members of the security forces and are believed to be politically-motivated extrajudicial renditions. However, in several of these cases, "renditioned" individuals were subjected to torture by security forces or killed.

In July 2018, President Museveni reinstated the Flying Squad Unit (FSU) in order to curb rising numbers of kidnappings. The unit had been disbanded due to corruption and allegations of torture, despite its ostensible effectiveness in mitigating serious crimes. Beyond the reinstatement of the FSU, President Museveni also commissioned the National Command and Control Center at Nateete Police Station, Kampala, in October 2018 as part of the government's mitigation plan. As a result, the crime rate reduced in Kampala, however, other urban centres such as Wakiso, Jinja, Mbale and Arua, continue to have a limited police presence, thereby increasing the risk of organised crimes, such as kidnappings and armed robberies.

c. Civil unrest

Protests in Kampala are mainly politically-motivated or occur against poor infrastructure, such as roads and the electric grid. In most cases, the protests escalate to violence, often resulting in arrests, minimal casualties including injuries from clashes with police and route obstructions. Security forces have repeatedly been accused of a heavy-handed approach towards protesters, injuring and killing them during large-scale protests.

Three of the most recent triggers for substantial protests were the introduction of an additional tax on the use of social media, with mobile money agents marching on Parliament on 05th July. Shortly afterwards, On 11th July 2018, activists and the prominent Kyadondo East Member of Parliament (MP) Robert Kyagulanyi (aka Bobi Wine) organised a demonstration march in Central Kampala against the imposed social media tax and was subsequently arrested by security forces. This entailed a series of protests in Kampala – particularly near the central Kiseka Market – and elsewhere by supporters of Bobi Wine, leading to large-scale arrests of demonstrators and an increasing number of protests in population centres. Bobi Wine was eventually released on 27th August.

d. Road traffic accidents

Road traffic accidents are widespread in Kampala. Both bus and taxi drivers routinely violate speed limits and the right of way. Traffic congestion caused by accidents or protests are a daily occurrence and may exacerbate transportation. The matatu buses in particular have been observed to pose a significant risk to other motorists. Traffic lights installed in an attempt to control traffic are often not operational or are ignored by motorists and roads may be blocked off ahead of major political events with little prior notice. Traffic police officers and also maintain a presence along most major roads. Police officers have been reported to falsely accuse motorists of traffic offences in an attempt to solicit bribes, therefore vigilance is advised.

Breakdown of incident types recorded in Kampala over the past 12 months

e. Terrorism

The threat of terrorism in Uganda is assessed as low, however, it is noted that the possibility of an attack by militant Islamist groups – most notably the Somalia-based al Shabaab group – cannot be dismissed due to Uganda's troop contribution to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). At the present time, it is assessed that al Shabaab militants only maintain a highly peripheral presence in Uganda due to its relative distance to Somalia and the lack of an active Somali diaspora in the country, with Kenya remaining al Shabaab's primary theatre of operations outside of Somalia. However, the last recorded al Shabaab attack in Kampala on 10th July 2010 was of particular severity, when double person-borne improvised explosive devices (PBIEDs) were detonated among crowds watching a screening of the 2010 FIFA World Cup Final match at two locations in Kampala, killing 74 individuals and injuring 71 others. In its claim of responsibility, al Shabaab explicitly stated that the attack was in retaliation for Uganda's participation in AMISOM. The government has since conducted operations, arresting suspected facilitators and raiding mosques.

Beyond the threat from al Shabaab, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) – an Islamist rebel group founded in 1996 – continues to conduct operations in neighbouring DRC. While the group generally only crosses into Uganda to evade Congolese security forces, additional raids targeting civilian targets and security forces in the Western border region remain conceivable. However, the threat the ADF poses to targets in Kampala is currently assessed to be minimal. Similarly, the Islamic State (IS) group is reported to maintain a limited presence in Uganda, focused on facilitating payments between IS operatives in other countries as well as to the ADF, although

this remains unconfirmed. The Sheraton Kampala would represent a valuable target to terrorists due to its local prominence and the likely presence of foreign nationals, although its direct proximity to State House and presence of armed personnel somewhat reduces the feasibility of an attack (see below).

Conclusions

The overall threat level at the Sheraton Kampala is considered to be **low**, with no inhibitive risks identified during the assessment. An extensive set of security measures in terms of access control, building security and technical security in particular has been implemented at the site, which is assessed to effectively mitigate most common security threats prevalent in the area. The in-depth search protocols for both staff and guests at the main entrance points are more extensive than in most hotels in East Africa and – based on observations during the assessment and online reviews by hotel guests – are implemented in a strict fashion. The presence of a large number of armed police and other security forces at the site – who are stationed at the main entrance as well as in plain clothes within the main building – also represents a valuable addition to the hotel's overall security.

The most prominent weakness in the hotel's security arrangement identified during the assessment is the pedestrian access gate along the Southern perimeter, which is only guarded by a single unarmed security guard equipped only with a single handheld metal detector. There are no bollards located at the entrance and the gate – made of metal bars topped with razor wire – could be easily breached from the adjacent Nile Avenue. Beyond this, the lack of electric fencing along the perimeter wall and the inadequately secured Northeastern perimeter towards the adjacent hotel complex remain sources of concern. Moreover, the absence of an adequate safe haven facility that could withstand a sustained assault and could accommodate both guests and personnel at the site is of note.

As with most urban centres in East Africa, crime rates remain a source for concern, although numbers in Kampala are somewhat lower than what is encountered in other comparable cities, such as Nairobi. Thus, over the course of the past 12 months, only a limited number of security-related incidents were recorded in the general vicinity of the site. However, opportunistic criminal activity, in particular petty theft, at the site still remains a concern, but given the comprehensive mitigation measures currently in place would necessitate the involvement of hotel staff or, alternatively, occur in areas open to the public (restaurant, bar). In addition, underlying threats to individuals travelling to and from the site from criminal elements and incidents of civil unrest also remain in place and have to be considered.

It is noted that the threat from terrorism in general in Uganda is low. However, the country's participation in the international mission in Somalia and proximity to major hosts of insecurity (DRC, South Sudan) combined with the transnational character of modern terrorism results in a residual threat towards the site. As with most hotels outside of active conflict theatres, the mitigation measures at the Sheraton Kampala are unlikely to deter a premeditated, well-resourced complex attack, as was demonstrated in the 15th January 2019 attack targeting the hardened 14 Riverside Drive complex in Nairobi, Kenya. However, it is also noted that

mitigation measures currently in place combined with the close proximity of the site to major installations of the security forces would serve to deter assailants from attacking the site, despite its prominence and value as a target, and minimise their success in case of an attack.

ANNEX 1 – Risk Matrix

Quantifying Risk: A Methodology

The SF risk matrix is designed to provide the reader with a visual representation of the threat breakdown specific to a site. The assessment should not be considered generic for the area and all ratings take into account the profile of the site. SF has worked extensively with our methodology for quantifying risk. Whilst it is accepted that some level of informed qualitative assessment is necessary, subjectivity is removed where possible. Parameters have been modified and variables extensively and constantly reviewed to provide a dynamic and accurate representation of the threat level. It must be noted that although the risk matrix is a useful aid, it should be utilised in conjunction with the full discursive risk assessment, rather than independently. All ratings are assessed for an **unmitigated** site.

Risk is calculated as **likelihood** multiplied by **impact**. A number of guidelines suggest that likelihood should be assessed solely on historical precedence. This is considered overly simplistic and as such SF assess 'likelihood' for each threat by calculating the mean rating for the following, each ranked out of 5:

- **Historical Precedence**: how many incidents have there been over the past year?
- **Capability**: what capacity do malcontents have to launch an attack of this sort against the target?
- **Intent**: Based on the target / project's profile, would a group have the intent to move against it?
- **Vulnerability**: Could the target defend itself against attack?[1]

SF assess the impact of a threat as the mean rating for the effect on people, assets, the environment and the organisation's reputation. Each category is ranked 0-5 based on the following guidelines:

	People	Assets	Environment[2]	Reputation
0	No health effect / illness	No damage	No effect	No impact
1	Slight health effect/ illness	Slight damage	Slight effect	Slight impact
2	Minor health effect / illness	Minor damage	Minor effect	Limited impact
3	Major health effect / illness	Local damage	Local effect	Considerable impact

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[1] Unmitigated will be rated at least 3

[2] 'Environmental impact' as a rating is specific to OGP guidelines. However, In many contexts, the terms 'environs' or ' immediate surroundings' are assessed to be more relevant. Effectively, what is the spatial impact?

4	Single fatality	Major damage	Major effect	National impact
5	Multiple fatalities	Extensive damage	Massive effect	International impact

Both likelihood and impact are thus rated out of 5 for each threat. The likelihood and impact ratings are then multiplied together to produce a risk rating ranging from 0-25.

0 - 4	Negligible
4.1 - 7	Low
7.1 - 12	Moderate
12.1 - 16	High
16.1 - 25	Very High

Crime

The historical precedence of criminal activity in Kampala is somewhat lower than in other comparable cities in East Africa, but remains a source for concern, particularly with regards to opportunistic crimes such as petty theft. Incidents of more organised forms of armed robbery, vehicle hijackings and home-invasions have also been reported. Due to the perceived wealth of guests at the Sheraton Kampala, the intent to target the site is considered high. Given the comparable strength of the outer perimeter, however, vulnerability is assessed to be low. The impact of crimes would vary dependent upon the type of criminal activity that is encountered. In an incident of organised crime, casualties and potentially a fatality could occur. Assets could be significantly impacted. The reputational damage resulting from this could be high. Opportunistic crimes have a low impact overall, with little effect on personnel, assets, environment and reputation.

Opportunistic	Likelihood: 3 Impact: 2	Risk Rating: 6 (LOW)
Organised	Likelihood: 2.5 Impact: 2.75	Risk Rating: 6.8 (LOW)

Terrorism

The last attack perpetrated by a terrorist group in Kampala took place in July 2010 and no substantial activity of al Shabaab militants or other terrorist organisations has been recorded in Kampala since. However, due to its military engagement in Somalia, Uganda is still considered to be a potential target to al Shabaab, the Islamic State (IS) and other similar groups. Furthermore, the Sheraton Kampala would represent a valuable target to terrorists due to its local prominence and the likely presence of foreign nationals at the conference. Nearby Embassies and government institutions could also be conceivably targeted, although the two most likely targets (US, Israel) are located in considerable distance to the site. At the same time, the high density of government installations also translates into a high density of armed security officers, both at the site and in the general vicinity of the site, which would greatly reduce the response time in case of an incident. Any terrorist attack would likely involve the use of small explosive devices as typical *modus operandi*, possibly combined with a firearm attack. Both types of attack could result in multiple fatalities and severe damage to assets, though an explosive attack would likely cause more asset damage. The reputational damage to the client in the event of an attack is likely to be high.

| Terrorism	Likelihood: 2 Impact: 4.25	Risk Rating: 8.5 (MODERATE)

Kidnap for ransom

Kidnap for ransom incidents are not recorded with a high frequency in Kampala, although underreporting likely also influences the number of reported incidents, as indicated by the re-establishment of the dedicated Flying Squad Unit (FSU) in response to a string of kidnappings in July 2018. Foreign nationals and individuals associated with internationally recognised companies are particularly valuable to kidnappers. The impact of a kidnap could be significant, as both personnel and reputation could be severely affected. Although the nature of the conference and the high profile of the Sheraton Kampala means that participants would likely pose valuable targets for kidnappers, the extent of the mitigation measures on site are likely to mitigate potential attacks. However, kidnappings conducted whilst in transit to the site or from one of the adjacent entertainment venues must also be considered, particularly given the potential longer stay of participants of the conference in Kampala and the resultant establishment of observable routines.

Kidnap for Ransom	Likelihood: 2.5 Impact: 2.75	Risk Rating: 6.8 (LOW)

Civil unrest

The site is somewhat removed from primary hotspots for civil unrest in Kampala, most notably Makerere University, which is located approximately 2.5 kilometres Northwest of the site and records frequent clashes between students and police over various points of contention, including internal administrative decisions taken by the University's administration. As such, the direct threat posed to the site is considered to be low. There is a history of large protests turning violent and resulting in the burning or stoning of vehicles and pedestrians, exacerbated by the involvement of security forces, who routinely deploy teargas and live ammunition to disperse protestors. As such, individuals may be affected on their transport routes to and from the site itself and could get caught up in a spontaneous protest. Given the tendency of protests to turn violent, both assets and individuals may be affected. In the unlikely event that protests would target the site directly, these impacts would be amplified, in addition to further reputational damage.

Civil Unrest	Likelihood: 2.75 Impact: 2.5	Risk Rating: 6.8 (LOW)

LIKELIHOOD

	A	B	C	D	E
1					
2			Opportunistic crime		
3			Civil unrest / Kidnap for ransom / Organised crime		
4					
5		Terrorism			

With the correct mitigation measures in place, all threats to the site are considered to be acceptable (all fall into the orange segment). No threats are considered terminal to the hotels' operations (red).

FOR ANY ENQUIRIES REGARDING THIS REPORT OR ANY OTHER COMPANY DELIVERABLES, PLEASE CONTACT:

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